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Attached are some notes on the briefing of
the Board by Mr. Kennan.




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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of the Board of National Estimates by Ambassador Kennan

1. Yugoslav-Soviet Relations. The 1948 break was unwelcome to Tito--he was forced into it. If in 1949 he had been given the terms for reconciliation which Khrushchev subsequently offered him, he would have accepted them. Since then, however, the break has created its own momentum and has produced new habits and ties. As a result, Tito's price for rejoining the Bloc has risen. Mr. Kennan does not believe there is an objective possibility of Yugoslav reassociation with the Bloc because this would now require drastic capitulation by one side or the other. On the Soviet side, the capitulation would be so great as to cause dissolution of the Bloc. In 1956 Khrushchev practically capitulated to Tito, but the capitulation was incompatible with the requirements of the USSR in the satellite area. The capitulation helped to spark the 1956 revolts and disturbances. Ever since, the barrier to Soviet capitulation has been the disunity of the Bloc, not its unity. That is, Khrushchev cannot offer terms which will suit all the disparate elements in the Bloc. If he is too lenient, other Bloc countries will want the same. If he is too harsh, Tito will, of course, not buy.

2. Kennan's Analysis of Tito. Tito has never lost his emotional political involvement with the Bloc. He is a simple man of relatively good character--not a thug--not an intriguer--a positive type. He looks upon the Socialist Bloc as his family, and as made up of the kind of people he can be for. What he wants most is to have the other Bloc parties recognize that he is a socialist of integrity, that he took the right course in breaking with Stalin and in following the Yugoslav road to socialism, and that he is not a tool of the imperialists. Nothing will ever replace this need. At the same time, Tito rather likes Americans. When Bloc ambassadors attack the U. S. in his presence, he replies that Americans are not so bad. There is no hatred or trickiness in his approach to us. Nonetheless, our opinions will never mean as much to him as the opinions of Moscow or even Peking. This is why he has spoken as he has about Berlin and about the Soviet decision to resume nuclear tests. He is desperately anxious that the Bloc understand that his independence is not inimical to it.

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3. Voluntary Support of Bloc vs Support Provided Under Discipline.

One might ask what practical difference his voluntary support for Bloc foreign policy positions makes as compared with support resulting from submission to Bloc discipline. One answer is that his emotional attachment is a dying thing which is not shared by many other Yugoslav party members especially among the younger party people. Moreover, his emotional attachment and his foreign policy support does not mean much in terms of practical politics. Other senior Yugoslav Communists "tut tut" him. Their attitude is one of amused reverence for him. Tito does not really run things--much of the time he is at Brioni taking care of his health while other people are pulling the levers.

4. Complexities Surrounding a Possible Yugoslav Return to the Bloc. If the return were on Tito's terms, i.e. complete autonomy for Yugoslavia in selecting its own path to socialism:

a. The Soviet party would be required to accept the Yugoslav party program explicitly. This would take a concrete act because the Soviet party has already explicitly denounced and rejected the Yugoslav program.

b. The other satellites would ask themselves what there is in the Yugoslav program which they might like to adopt. There would be a real danger that the Poles, Rumanians, and Hungarians would take a path much closer to that of Tito than to that of the Soviet Union. If so, this would raise the question as to where the center of the Communist movement is actually located.

c. There would be a similar effect on non-ruling Communist parties, especially the Italian.

d. The defiance of the Albanians would be legitimized.

If the return were on Soviet terms:

a. Tito would have to drop his unaligned nations gambit.

b. The Bloc could not replace what Yugoslavia receives as a result of its Western economic ties. The Yugoslav economic program would be wrecked.

c. The guts would be torn out of the morale of the Yugoslav party.

d. The Yugoslavs could no longer continue their program of internal decentralization and this would be very hard to reverse.

The only thing that might bring a Yugoslav return to the Bloc with the support of both the party and the people would be the US going too far with rearming West Germany (e.g., giving it an independent nuclear capability) or helping the Germans to push toward Balkan hegemony. This whole problem worries Mr. Kennan considerably. He feels that we must do a better job of explaining the basis of our German policy in Eastern Europe.

5. Stalinists in the Yugoslav Party. Mr. Kennan does not know personally of a single Stalinist in the Yugoslav party but there are probably some tucked away here and there. Many senior Yugoslav Communists make trouble for the US not because they are Stalinists, but because they are anti-German and oppose our German policy. Still others make trouble because they have a Nasser-African-anti colonial complex.

6. Khrushchevites in the Yugoslav Party. There are supporters of Khrushchev in the Yugoslav party, including most of the senior party members. They believe that Khrushchev is a concealed revisionist and, according to Mr. Kennan, they are right. If left on his own, Khrushchev would be highly pragmatic. The Yugoslavs feel that Khrushchev has Soviet dogmatist opposition which has pro-Stalinist and pro-Chinese ideas and which believes that Khrushchev has gone too far. Mr. Kennan agrees, and says that this opposition has been very clever. It is not organized, its members have not been in formal contact with one another, but its members are bound together by a common ideological view and a silent and unspoken conspiracy to contain Khrushchev.

7. Khrushchev's Position. Mr. Kennan went on to say that he had used the word "contain" (last sentence above) advisedly, because he does not believe that Khrushchev's opposition wants to overthrow him. Khrushchev is a phenomenal politician with tremendous energy and capacity for work. He can talk to the common people and will take on anybody in debate. Those around Khrushchev shudder at the thought of having to take on and do the things which Khrushchev is now doing and of assuming his responsibilities. However, they have taken him under tight control ever since the U-2 incident. Khrushchev is not by himself really running things. He is not in control of party personnel matters, probably not in control on ideological matters, but probably does control on questions of foreign affairs. Somewhat like Malenkov, Khrushchev is stronger in the government than in the party. He has had to defer to military pressures on nuclear testing and on Finland, probably to get support from the military members of the Central Committee.

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8. Tito's Performance at the Neutral Nations Conference. Mr. Kennan agreed that this performance was in part designed to give Khrushchev a helping hand. Tito was given three or four days notice of the Soviet decision to resume testing. He remonstrated, but finally decided to support the Soviets. He subsequently wrote a letter of protest to Khrushchev and got a reply in which Khrushchev maintained his position. Neither of these documents has been published, but Mr. Kennan is aware of the gist of what they contained.

9. Yugoslavia and Albania. The Yugoslav attitude cuts in many ways:

a. The Yugoslavs are nervous about the present Albanian situation, which they believe endangers their security.

b. They are delighted that Hoxha is in trouble. They have always looked upon the Albanian party as their party, which they helped create and which they persuaded Lenin to admit to the Comintern.

c. They are concerned about their Albanian minority of several hundred thousand people.

d. They will not make any military moves unless somebody else does.

e. They would be delighted to subvert Hoxha if they could, and so would Khrushchev. Hoxha, however, is a true Stalinist and knows how to protect himself against these things. He has got rid of virtually all the people who could provide a center for internal opposition, and he cannot be subverted at the present time. The worm could turn, however, e.g. if we do not help Albania (it would be mad for us to do so) and the Chinese fail to do so adequately.

As it now stands, the Albanian situation is the best possible for the US. The less we interfere and the less we do for the Albanians, the tougher it becomes for the Chinese. If the Chinese do an adequate job of providing economic support to Albania, it will prove a considerable burden to them, e.g. expenditures of foreign exchange to buy foodstuffs for Albania. If the Chinese fail to do a good job of supporting Albania economically, they will lose prestige. This situation could, of course, change, so we must watch things very carefully.

10. Yugoslav Attitude and Policies Toward the Underdeveloped Countries. Tito has always feared total isolation. Until the Hungarian revolt, he wanted to develop a Yugoslav-led circle of

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Eastern European satellites. Hungary proved that this course was dangerous to the Yugoslavs as well as to the Russians, because it showed that once things got started, they would not necessarily stop at Titoism. This was because the other satellite leaders could not imitate Tito--they are not independent leaders but Russian stooges who could not keep things from going too far. In this situation, what was Tito to do? His thoughts turned to the new nations of Asia and Africa. In addition to preventing Yugoslav isolation, Tito also wanted to build up bargaining power vis-a-vis the USSR and Communist China. The Belgrade Conference did raise his prestige and the USSR knows it. The USSR also knows that it cannot take after Tito militarily without estranging the unaligned countries. (Mr. Kennan noted that the British in Yugoslavia do not agree with the foregoing assessment, but he did not describe what the British do believe.) The break-up of the UAR was a great shock to the Yugoslavs. So was the failure of their attempt to build on Gizenga and their discovery that while they were whooping it up for Tunisia over the Bizerte problem, Tunisia was negotiating with France. Tito is therefore getting leary of his African wild men, and the anti-colonial and anti-American gang in the foreign office is losing strength.

11. The Relationship of Yugoslav Foreign Policy Positions to Their Assessment of the Likelihood of War. Whenever the Yugoslavs believe that the chances of war are becoming greater then ^{we} can expect them to take foreign policies positions closer to ~~that~~ ^{those} of the Soviet Union. Last summer the Yugoslavs were relatively fearful that war might break out over Berlin. This no doubt accounted in part for Yugoslav support of the Soviet Union re testing at the Belgrade Conference.

12. Comments on Berlin. The removal of the year-end deadline for a German peace treaty may not at all have been the result of Soviet softening. It may have been because the military came to Khrushchev and said: "Look, if you are really serious and are going to push this to the ragged edge, you are going to have to give us some time to get ready." Kennan is not arguing that this is in fact what happened, but he thinks that this could be the correct explanation. He is disturbed by sinister parallels with the situation in 1939, The reckless decision on renewing nuclear tests reminded him of 1939 when the Russians concluded a non-aggression pact with the Germans while negotiating with the West, and announced it in such a blunt and brutal way that it alienated Communists and fellow travelers the world over.

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Mr. Kennan hypothesized that the Soviets had concluded that the latter were expendable, because the Soviets believed that war was coming. Mr. Kennan also noted that there was Soviet pressure on the Finns in 1939, designed to secure their military position in that area prior to the anticipated war, just as there has been pressure recently. Mr. Kennan emphasized that he would not carry this line of reasoning too far, that nobody in State shares this view, and that he was probably wrong.



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